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Abstract 
 
Personalization of e-services poses new challenges to database technology. In particular, a powerful and flexible 
modeling technique is needed for complex preferences, which may even come from several parties with different 
intentions. Preference queries against a database have to be answered cooperatively by treating preferences as 
soft constraints, attempting a best possible match-making. We propose a strict partial order semantics for prefer-
ences, which closely matches people’s intuition. A broad variety of natural preferences and of sophisticated 
preferences using ranked scores are covered by this model. Moreover, we show how to inductively construct 
complex preferences from base preferences by means of various preference constructors including Pareto accu-
mulation. This preference model is the key to a new discipline called preference engineering and to a preference 
algebra. We present a collection of laws, including an intuitive non-discrimination theorem for Pareto prefer-
ences. Given the Best-Matches-Only query model we investigate how complex preference queries can be de-
composed into simpler ones, preparing the ground for divide & conquer algorithms.  We succeed to verify inter-
esting adaptive filter effects of preference queries. Standard database query languages can be extended seam-
lessly by such preferences as exemplified by Preference SQL and Preference XPATH. In summary we believe 
that this preference model, featuring an algebraic foundation that matches intuition, is appropriate to extend 
database technology by preferences as soft constraints. Building efficient preference query optimizers, which can 
cope with the intrinsic non-monotonic nature of preference queries, investigations on how to e-negotiate in this 
preference model and a systematic approach to preference engineering are now feasible steps towards advanced 
database support for the ubiquitous real world phenomenon of preferences. 
1 Introduction 
Preferences are everywhere in all our daily and business lives. Recently they are catching wide-spread attention 
in the software community ([ACM00]), in particular in terms of personalization for B2C or B2B e-services. Thus 
it becomes also a challenge for database technology to adequately cope with the many sophisticated aspects of 
preferences. Personalization has different facets: There is the ‘exact world’, where user wishes can be satisfied 
completely or not at all. In this scenario user options are restricted to a pre-defined set of fixed choices, e.g. for 
software configurations according to user profiles. Database queries in this context are characterized by hard 
constraints, delivering exactly the dream objects if they are there and otherwise reject the user’s request. But 
there is also the ‘real world’, where personal preferences behave quite differently. Such preferences are under-
stood in the sense of wishes: Wishes are free, but there is no guarantee that they can be satisfied at all times. In 
case of failure for a perfect match people are not always, but usually prepared to accept worse alternatives or to 
negotiate compromises. Thus preferences in the real world require a paradigm shift from exact matches towards 
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best possible match-making, which means that preferences are to be treated as soft constraints. Moreover, pref-
erences in the real world cannot be treated in isolation. Instead there may be multi-criteria decision situations 
where even multiple interested parties are involved, e.g. in e-shopping where e-customers and e-vendors have 
their own, maybe conflicting preferences. For a truly pervasive role of personalization these considerations sug-
gest that database query languages should support both worlds. But whereas the exact-match paradigm been 
investigated in the database and Web context already by large amounts, leading to a bundle of successful tech-
nologies (e.g. SQL, E/R-modeling, XML), the paradigm of preference-driven choices in the real world is lagging 
behind. 
 
Let us exemplify the unsatisfying state of the art by looking at those many SQL-based search engines of e-shops, 
which cannot cope adequately with real user preferences: All too often no or no reasonable answer is returned 
though one has tried hard filling out query forms to match one’s personal preferences closely. Most probably, 
one has encountered answers before sounding like “no hotels, vehicles, flights, etc. could be found that matched 
your criteria; please try again with different choices”. The case of repeatedly receiving empty query results turns 
out to be extremely disappointing to the user, and it is even more harmful for the e-merchant. Dictating the user 
to leave some entries in the query form unspecified often leads to the other unpleasant extreme: an overloading 
with lots of mostly irrelevant information. There have been some approaches to cope with these deficiencies, 
notably in the context of cooperative database systems ([Mot88, GaL94, CYC96, Min98]). There the technique 
of query relaxation has been studied in order to deal with the empty result problem. Since many decades prefer-
ences have also played a big role in the economic and social sciences, in particular for multi-attribute decision-
making in operations research ([Arr59, KeR93, BLL01]). Machine learning and knowledge discovery ([KiQ01]) 
are further areas where preferences are under investigation. Each of these approaches and lines of research has 
explored some of the challenges put by preferences. 
 
However, a comprehensive solution that paves the way for a smooth and efficient integration of preferences with 
database technology has not yet been published. We think that a viable preference model for database systems 
should meet the following list of desiderata: 
 
(1) An intuitive semantics, covering a wide spectrum of applications: Preferences must be included as first class 
citizens into the modeling process. This demands an intuitive understanding and declarative specification of 
preferences. A universal preference model should cover non-numerical as well as numerical ranking methods, 
and it should smoothly integrate with hard constraints from the exact world. 
(2) A concise mathematical foundation: This requirement goes without saying, but of course the mathematical 
foundation must harmonize with the intuitive semantics. 
(3) A constructive and extensible preference model: Elevating preferences to the rank of first class citizens for 
application modeling requires that a rich preference model is supported. Complex preferences should be built up 
inductively from simpler preferences using an extensible repertoire of preference constructors. 
(4) Conflicts of preferences must not cause a system failure: Dynamic composition of complex preferences must 
be supported even in the presence of conflicts. A practical preference model should be able to live with conflicts, 
not to prohibit them or to fail if they occur.  
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(5) Declarative preference query languages: Match-making in the real world means bridging the gap between 
wishes and reality. This implies the need for a new query model other than the exact match model of declarative 
query languages like SQL or XPATH. A smooth integration and an efficient implementation are prerequisites for 
its widespread acceptance. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basics of preferences as strict partial or-
ders. In section 3 we present a powerful preference model as the key to preference engineering. Section 4 is 
concerned with the development of a preference algebra. Section 5  investigates issues of preference queries 
under the BMO query model and provides decomposition algorithms for complex preference queries. Practical 
aspects of preference query languages are covered in section 6. Finally section 7 summarizes our results and 
outlines ongoing and future work. 
2 Preferences as strict partial orders 
Preferences in the real world show up in quite different forms as everybody is aware of. However, a careful 
examination of their vary nature reveals that they share a fundamental common principle. Let’s examine the 
domain of daily life with its abundance of preferences that may come from subjective feelings or other intuitive 
influences. In this familiar setting it turns out that people express their wishes frequently in terms like “I like A 
better than B“. This kind of preference modeling is universally applied and intuitively understood by every-
body. In fact, every child learns to apply it from its earliest youth. Thinking of preferences in terms of ‘better-
than’ has a very natural counterpart in mathematics: One can map such real life preferences straightforwardly 
onto strict partial orders. People are intuitively used to deal with such preferences, in particular with those that 
are not expressed in terms of numerical scores. But there is also another part of real life which primarily is con-
cerned with sophisticated economical or technical issues, where numbers do matter. One can easily recognize 
that the familiar numerical ranking can be subsumed under this semantics. Therefore modeling preferences as 
strict partial orders holds great promises, which of course has been recognized at various opportunities and situa-
tions in computer science and other disciplines before. Here this key finding receives our undivided attention.  
 
A preference is formulated as strict partial order on a set of attribute names with an associated domain of values, 
which figuratively speaking is the ‘realm of wishes’. When combining preferences P1 and P2 into another pref-
erence P, we decide that P1 and P2 may overlap on their attributes, allowing multiple preferences to coexist on 
the same attributes. This generality is due to our design principle that conflicts of preferences must be allowed in 
practice and must not be considered as a bug.  
 
Let A denote a non-empty set of attribute names, where each single attribute Ai has an associated domain of 
values dom(Ai): A = {A1: data_type1, A2: data_type2,  … ,  Ak: data_typek} 
dom(A) := dom({A1, A2, … , Ak}) := dom(A1) × dom(A2) × … × dom(Ak) 
For brevity we often omit the data types; if A has only one element, we omit set notation. The order of compo-
nents within the Cartesian product is considered irrelevant. Following above design decision this definition in-
cludes, e.g.,  the following: If B = {A1, A2} and C =  {A2, A3}, then dom(B ∪ C) = dom({A1, A2} ∪ {A2, A3}) = 
dom(A1) × dom(A2) × dom(A3). 
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Definition 1 Preference P = (A, <P)   
A preference P is a strict partial order P = (A, <P), where A is a set of attribute names and <P ⊆ dom(A) × 
dom(A). Thus <P is irreflexive and transitive (which imply asymmetry).1  
Thus for all x, y, z ∈ dom(A) we have: [irreflexivity] ¬(x <P x) 
[transitivity] x <P y  ∧  y <P z    imply   x <P z 
Important is this intended interpretation:   “x <P y” is interpreted as “I like y better than x”  
A distinctive feature of partial orders are unranked values, i.e. values x and y such that ¬(x <P y)  ∧  ¬(y <P x) 
holds. Since preferences reflect important aspects of the real world a good visual representation is essential. 
 
Definition 2 Better-than graph, quality notions 
In finite domains a preference P can be drawn as a directed acyclic graph G, called the ‘better-than’ graph of P. 
In mathematical terms ‘better-than’ graphs are known as Hasse diagrams ([DaP90]). 
Given a ‘better-than’ graph G for P we define the following quality notions between values x, y in G: 
- x <P y (i.e. y is better than x), if y is predecessor of x in G. 
- Values in G without a predecessor are maximal elements of P, being at level 1. 
- Values in G without a successor are minimal elements of P. 
- x is on level j, if the longest path from x to a maximal value has j-1 edges. 
- If there is no directed path between x and y in G, then x and y are unranked. 
In numerical domains we will use a continuous distance function (see examples later on) instead of the discrete 
level function to describe quality notions. Here is a formal definition of maximal values, given P = (A, <P): 
 max(P) :=  {v ∈ dom(A) | v is maximal in P} =  {v ∈ dom(A) | ¬(∃  w ∈ dom(A):   v  <P w} 
 
Definition 3 Special cases of preferences 
a) Chain preference: P = (A, <P) is called chain preference, if for all x, y ∈ dom(A), x ≠ y:  x <P y  ∨  y <P x   
b) Anti-chain preference:  S↔  = (S,  ∅) is called anti-chain preference, given any set of values S. 
c) Dual preference: The dual preference Pδ = (A, <Pδ ) reverses the order on P:    x <P∂ y   iff   y <P x 
d) Subset preference:  Given P = (A, <P), every subset S ⊆ dom(A) induces a preference P⊆ = (S, <P⊆) called 
subset preference of P, if for any x, y ∈ S:    x <P⊆  y   iff   x <P y 
 
Thus all values x of a chain preference P (also called total order) are ranked to all other values y. Any set S, 
including dom(A) for an attribute A, can be converted into an anti-chain. Special subset preferences, called data-
base preferences, will become important later on, when we discuss the issue of preference queries. 
 
Definition 4 range(<P), disjoint preferences 
Given P = (A, <P) let range(<P) := {x ∈ dom(A) | ∃y dom(A):  (x, y) ∈ <P  or  (y, x) ∈ <P}. 
 P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2) are called disjoint preferences, if:    range(<P1) ∩ range(<P2) = ∅ 
                                                           
1 Some people prefer to deal with non-strict partial orders ≤P. Mathematically, any strict partial order can be translated into 
its  non-strict form in a canonical way ([DaP90]). 
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3 Preference Engineering 
Complex wishes are abundant in daily private and business life, even those concerning several attributes. Thus 
there is a high demand for a powerful and orthogonal framework that supports the accumulation of single prefer-
ences into more complex ones. This accumulation should follow some general principles that are present in real 
life and have an intuitive semantics. We present an inductive approach towards constructing complex prefer-
ences. This preference model will enable us to perform a systematic preference engineering. It will likewise 
define the formal basis for the preference algebra introduced later on.  
3.1 Inductive construction of preferences 
The goal is to provide intuitive and convenient ways to inductively construct a preference P = (A, <P).  To this 
end we specify P by a so-called preference term which fixes the attribute names A and the strict partial order <P. 
We distinguish between base preferences (our atomic preference terms) and compound preferences.  Since each 
preference term represents a strict partial order (which we will prove later on), we identify it with a preference P. 
 
Definition 5 Preference term 
P is a preference term if and only if P is one of the following: 
(1) Any base preference baseprefi. 
(2) Any subset preference of a preference P1: P := P1⊆ 
(3) Any dual preference of a preference P1:  P := P1∂ 
(4) Any complex preference P gained by applying one of the following preference constructors to given 
preferences P1 and P2: 
• Accumulating preference constructors: 
- Pareto accumulation: P := P1 ⊗ P2 
- Prioritized accumulation: P := P1 & P2 
- Numerical accumulation: P := rank(F)(P1, P2) 
• Aggregating preference constructors: 
- Intersection aggregation: P := P1 ♦ P2 
- Disjoint union aggregation: P := P1 + P2 
- Linear sum aggregation: P := P1 ⊕ P2  
 
We assume a finite set a base preferences {basepref1, basepref2, …}, where each baseprefi  is assured to represent 
a strict partial order. Each of the stated preference constructors will be defined subsequently and will be proven 
to be closed under strict partial order semantics. Note that both the set of base preferences and the set of complex 
preference constructors can be enlarged whenever the application domain at hand has a frequent demand for it.  
3.2 Base preference constructors 
Important from a preference engineering point of view is that we can provide base preference constructors, 
which can be considered as  preference templates whose proper instantiation yields a base preference. Practical 
experiences ([KiK01]) showed that for e-shopping applications the following repertoire is highly valuable for 
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constructing powerful personalized search engines. Formally, a base preference constructor has two arguments, 
the first characterizing the attribute names A and the second the strict partial order <P. In the subsequent defini-
tions we provide both an intuitive and a formal definition, distinguishing between non-numerical (POS, NEG, 
POS/NEG, POS/POS, EXPLICIT) and numerical base preference constructors (AROUND, BETWEEN, LOW-
EST, HIGHEST, SCORE). 
3.2.1 Non-numerical base preferences 
Definition 6 Non-numerical base preference constructors 
a) POS preference:   P := POS(A, POS-set{v1, …, vm}) 
Intuitively:   A desired value should be one from a set of favorites v1, …, vm ∈ dom(A), called positive values. If 
this is not feasible, better than getting nothing any other value from dom(A) is acceptable. 
Formally:     Let POS-set ⊆ dom(A) be finite. P is a POS preference, if: x <P y  iff  x∉ POS-set  ∧  y ∈ POS-set 
All v ∈ POS-set are maximal, all v∉ POS-set are at level 2 and worse than all POS-set values. 
 
b) NEG preference:  P := NEG(A, NEG-set{v1, …, vm}) 
Intuitively:  A desired value should not be any from a set of dislikes v1, …, vm ∈ dom(A), called negative values. 
If this is not feasible, better than getting nothing any disliked value is acceptable. 
Formally:   Let NEG-set ⊆ dom(A) be finite. P is a NEG preference, if: x <P y  iff  y∉ NEG-set ∧ x ∈ NEG-set 
All v∉ NEG-set are maximal, all v ∈ NEG-set are on level 2 and worse than all maximal values. 
 
c) POS/NEG preference:  P := POS/NEG(A, POS-set{v1, …, vm}; NEG-set{vm+1, …, vm+n}) 
Intuitively:  A desired value should be one from a set of favorites. Otherwise it should not be any from a set of 
dislikes. If this is not feasible too, better than getting nothing any disliked value is acceptable. 
Formally:    Let POS-set, NEG-set ⊆ dom(A) be finite and disjoint. P is called POS/NEG preference, if: 
             x <P y   iff   (x ∈ NEG-set  ∧  y∉ NEG-set)  ∨  (x ∉ NEG-set  ∧  x ∉ POS-set  ∧  y ∈ POS-set) 
All v ∈ POS-set are maximal, all v ∈ NEG-set are on level 3, all others are on level 2. All maximal values are 
better than all level 2 values which are better than all level 3 values. 
 
d) POS/POS preference:  P := POS/POS(A, POS1-set{v1, …, vm}; POS2-set{vm+1, …, vm+n}) 
Intuitively:   A desired value should be one from a set of favorites. Otherwise it should be from a set of positive 
alternatives. If this is not feasible too, better than getting nothing any other value is acceptable. 
Formally:   Let POS1-set, POS2-set ⊆ dom(A) be finite and disjoint. POS1-set are the favorite values, POS2-set 
are the second-best alternatives. P is called POS/POS preference, if: 
x <P y   iff   (x ∈ POS2-set  ∧  y ∈ POS1-set)  ∨ 
                    (x ∉ POS1-set  ∧  x ∉ POS2-set  ∧  y ∈ POS2-set)  ∨   
                      (x ∉ POS1-set  ∧  x ∉ POS2-set  ∧  y ∈ POS1-set)  
All v ∈ POS1-set are maximal, all y ∈ POS2-set are on level 2, all others are on level 3. All POS1-set values are 
better than all POS2-set values which are better than all other values. 
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e) EXPLICIT preference:  P := EXPLICIT(A, EXPLICIT-graph{(val1, val2), … }) 
Intuitively:   Any finite preference can be “handcrafted” by explicitly enumerating ‘better-than’ relationships. 
Formally:   Let EXPLICIT-graph = {(val1, val2), … } represent a finite acyclic ‘better-than’ graph, where vali ∈ 
dom(A). Let V be the set of all vali occurring in EXPLICIT-graph. Then a strict partial order E = (V, 
<E) is induced as follows: 
 -  (vali, valj) ∈ EXPLICIT-graph implies  vali <E valj   
     -  vali <E valj   ∧  valj <E valk   imply    vali <E valk 
P is an EXPLICIT preference, if:    x <P y   iff   x <E y  ∨  (x ∉ range(<E)  ∧  y ∈ range(<E)) 
Note that all values in EXPLICIT-graph are better than all other values in dom(A). 
 
Example 1 Construction of base preferences 
• P = (Transmission, <P) := POS(Transmission, POS-SET{automatic}) 
• P = (Color, <P)  :=  POS/NEG(Color, POS-set{yellow}; NEG-set{gray}) 
• P = (Category, <P)  :=  POS/POS(Category, POS-set1{cabriolet}; POS-set2{roadster}) 
• P = (Color, <P) := EXPLICIT(Color, EXPLICIT-graph{(green, yellow), (green, red), (yellow, white)})    
Given dom(Color) = {white, red, yellow, green, brown, black} the ‘better-than’ graph of P is this:  
white 
   Thus white and red are maximal at level 1, yellow is at level 2, green 
yellow red   is at level 3 and the other values brown and black  are minimal at level 4. 
 
green 
 
brown black                   ☺ 
3.2.2 Numerical base preferences 
Now we focus on preferences P = (A, <P), where dom(A) is some numerical data type, e.g. Real or Decimal. 
Then a total comparison operator ‘<’ and the subtraction operator ‘−’ are predefined on dom(A). Instead of the 
discrete level function above, we now employ a continuous distance function working on ‘<’ and ‘−’.  
 
Definition 7 Numerical base preference constructors 
a) AROUND preference:  P := AROUND(A, z) 
Intuitively:  A desired value should be an explicitly stated value z. If this is not feasible, values with shortest 
distance apart from z will be acceptable. 
Formally:     Given a  value z ∈ dom(A), for all  v ∈ dom(A) we define: distance(v, z) := abs(v − z) 
          P is called AROUND preference, if:  x <P y   iff   distance(x, z) > distance(y, z)  
Note that if distance(x, z) = distance(y, z) and x ≠ y, then x and y are unranked. AROUND preferences (and the 
following base preferences) are also applicable to other ordered SQL types like Date. 
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b) BETWEEN preference:  P := BETWEEN(A, [low, up]) 
Intuitively:  A desired value should be between the bounds of an explicitly stated interval. If this is not feasible, 
values with  shortest distance apart from the interval boundaries will be acceptable. 
Formally:     Given an interval [low, up] ∈ dom(A) × dom(A), low ≤ up, for all  v ∈ dom(A) we define: 
distance(v, [low, up]) :=  if  v ∈ [low, up] then 0 else if  v < low then low − v else  v − up 
        P is called BETWEEN preference, if: x <P y   iff   distance(x, [low, up]) > distance(y, [low, up])  
Note that if distance(x, [low, up]) = distance(y, [low, up]) and x ≠ y, then x and y are unranked. 
 
c) LOWEST, HIGHEST preference:  P := LOWEST(A) , P = HIGHEST(A) 
Intuitively:   A desired value should be as low (high) as possible.  
Formally :    P is called LOWEST preference, if: x <P y   iff   x > y 
               P is called HIGHEST preference, if: x <P y   iff   x < y 
LOWEST and HIGHEST preferences are chains. 
 
d) SCORE preference:  P := SCORE(A, f) 
Intuitively:   Not available in general. 
Formally:    We assume a scoring function f: dom(A) → ℝ. Let ‘<’ be the familiar ‘less-than’ order on ℝ. Then 
P is called SCORE preference, if for x, y ∈ dom(A):      x <P y  iff  f(x) < f(y) 
Note that P need not be a chain, if the scoring function f is not a one-to-one mapping. 
3.3 Complex preference constructors 
The true power of preference modeling comes with the advent of complex preference constructors.  
3.3.1 Accumulating preference constructors  
Accumulating preference constructors combine preferences which may come from one or several parties. We 
consider Pareto accumulation ‘⊗’, prioritized accumulation ‘&’ and numerical accumulation ‘rank(F)’).  
The Pareto-optimality principle has been applied and studied intensively for decades for multi-attribute decision 
problems in the social and economic sciences. In our context we define it for n = 2 preferences as follows (a 
generalization to n > 2 is straightforward). 
 
Definition 8 Pareto preference:  P:= P1⊗P2 
Intuitively:  P1 and P2 are considered as equally important preferences. In order for v = (v1, v2) to being bet-
ter than w = (w1, w2), it is not tolerable that v is worse than w in any component value.  
Formally:    We assume two preferences P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2). For x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) ∈ 
dom(A1) × dom(A2) we define: 
                   x <P1⊗P2 y   iff   (x1 <P1 y1  ∧  (x2 <P2 y2  ∨  x2 = y2)) ∨ 
       (x2 <P2 y2  ∧  (x1 <P1 y1  ∨  x1 = y1)) 
P = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1⊗P2) is called Pareto preference. The maximal values of P are the Pareto-optimal set. 
Being a strict variant of the coordinate-wise order of cartesian products ([DaP90]), P is a strict partial order. 
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Example 2 Pareto preference (disjoint attribute names) 
Given dom(A1) = dom(A2) = dom(A3) = integer, we consider P1 := AROUND(A1, 0), P2 := LOWEST(A2),  
P3 := HIGHEST(A3) and a Pareto preference P4 = ({A1, A2, A3}, <P4) := (P1 ⊗ P2) ⊗ P3.  Let’s study a sub-
set preference of P4 for the following set R of values: 
R(A1, A2, A3) = {val1 = (−5, 3, 4), val2 = (−5, 4, 4), val3 = (5, 1, 8), val4 = (5, 6, 6), 
                            val5 = (−6, 0, 6), val6 = (−6, 0, 4), val7 = (6, 2, 7)} 
The ‘better-than’ graph of P4 for subset R can e.g. be obtained by performing exhaustive ‘better-than’ checks:  
Level 1:  val1 val3              val5  
 
 Level 2:  val2 val4 val7      val6  
Thus in this case the Pareto-optimal set is {val1, val3, val5}. Note that for each of P1, P2 and P3 at least one 
maximal value appears in the Pareto-optimal set: 5 and −5 for P1, 0 for P2 and 8 for P3.         ☺ 
Example 3 Pareto preference (shared attribute names) 
Let’s assume P5 := POS(Color, POS-set{green, yellow}), P6 := NEG(Color, NEG-set{red, green, blue, purple}), 
a Pareto preference P7 = (Color, <P7) := P5⊗P6 and a set of colors S := {red, green, yellow, blue, black, pur-
ple}. The ‘better-than’ graph of P7 for subset S looks as follows: 
Level 1:   yellow     green    black 
 
 Level 2:  red blue purple  
Note that P5 and P6 agreed both on ‘yellow’ being maximal, whereas only P5 ranked ‘green’ as maximal and 
only P6 ranked ‘black’ as maximal. The result in P7 is a non-discriminating compromise of both views.          ☺ 
Definition 9 Prioritized preference:  P:=  P1&P2 
Intuitively:   P1 is considered more important than P2. There is no compromise by P1; P2 is respected only 
where P1 does not mind. 
Formally:     We assume two preferences P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2). For x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) 
∈ dom(A1) × dom(A2) we define:  x <P1&P2 y    iff   x1 <P1 y1  ∨  (x1 = y1  ∧   x2 <P2 y2) 
P = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1&P2)  is called prioritized preference. It is a strict variant of the lexicographic order of 
cartesian products ([DaP90]), hence a strict partial order.  
Example 4 Prioritized accumulation (disjoint attribute names) 
Let’s revisit Example 2 from Pareto accumulation, now introducing two prioritized preferences P8  = ({A1, A2}, 
<P8) := P1&P2 and P9 = ({A1, A2, A3}, <P9) :=  (P1⊗P2) & P3. The ‘better-than’ graphs of P8 (left) and of P9 
(right) for subset R look as follows: 
     Level 1:            val1 val3   Level 1:  val1 val3  val5  
             
     Level 2: val2 val4   Level 2:  val2 val4 val7 val6 
 
     Level 3: val5 val6 val7               ☺ 
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Numerical accumulation builds on SCORE preferences P1, P2, …, Pn. The individual scores are accumulated into 
an overall score by applying a multi-attribute combining function F. We give its formal definition for n = 2; a 
generalization to n > 2 is obvious. 
 
Definition 10 Numerical preference:   P:=  rank(F)(P1, P2) 
Intuitively:   Not available in general. 
Formally:   We assume P1 := SCORE(A1, f1), P2 := SCORE(A2, f2) and a combining function F: ℝ × ℝ → ℝ. 
Let ‘<’ denote the ‘less-than’ order on ℝ. For x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) ∈ dom(A1) × dom(A2) 
we define:    x <rank(F)(P1, P2) y   iff   F(f1(x1), f2(x2)) < F(f1(y1), f2(y2)) 
P = (A1 ∪ A2, <rank(F)(P1, P2)) is called numerical preference. 
 
The proof of strict partial order is immediate, since ‘<’ is irreflexive and transitive. P need not be a chain, if F is 
not a one-to-one mapping. Also note that rank(F) is not an orthogonal preference constructor like ‘⊗’ or ‘&’. It 
can exclusively be applied to SCORE preferences. But vice versa, numerical preferences can be used as input to 
all other preference constructors. 
 
Example 5 Numerical preference (F as weighted sum) 
Let’s assume  P1 := SCORE(A1: Integer, f1), f1(x) := distance(x, 0) 
P2 := SCORE(A2: Integer, f2), f2(x) := distance(x, −2) 
and   P3 := rank(F)(P1, P2), F(x1, x2) := x1 + 2 ∗ x2 
We study:  R(A1, A2) = {val1 = (−5, 3), val2 = (−5, 4), val3 = (5, 1), val4 = (5, 6), val5 = (−6, 0), val6 = (−6, 0)} 
We evaluate f1 and f2 into a set Ranking-R, containing for each value of R its score vector for f1, f2 together 
with its combined F-ranking: 
Ranking-R = {(f12-val1 = (5, 5), F-val1 = 15), (f12-val2 = (5, 6), F-val2 = 17), 
                 (f12-val3 = (5, 3), F-val3 = 11), (f12-val4 = (5, 8), F-val4 = 21), 
               (f12-val5 = (6, 2), F-val5 = 10), (f12-val6 = (6, 2), F-val6 = 10)} 
The ‘better-than’ graph of P3 for subset R is not a chain and has 5 levels: 
 val4 → val2 → val1→ val3→ {val5, val6} 
As an interesting observation the maximal f1-value being 6 does not show up in the top performer val4, having 
f12-val4 = (5,8). In some sense this is like discriminating against P1.                 ☺ 
 
3.3.2 Aggregating preference constructors  
Aggregating preference constructors (♦, +, ⊕) pursue a different, technical purpose. All proofs of partial order 
semantics are straightforward, following [DaP90]). Intersection ‘♦’ and disjoint union ‘+’ perform a “piece-
wise” assembly of a preference P from separate pieces P1, P2, …, Pn, all acting on the same set of attributes. Vice 
versa, we will see later on how complex preferences can be decomposed  using ‘♦’ and ‘+’.  
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Definition 11 Intersection and disjoint union preferences 
Let P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2) be preferences on the same set of attribute names A. 
a) P = (A, < P1♦P2) is called intersection preference, if:     x <P1♦P2 y   iff   x <P1 y  ∧  x <P2 y 
b) If P1 and P2 are disjoint preferences, then P = (A, <P1+P2) is called disjoint union preference, if: 
x <P1+P2 y    iff   x <P1 y  ∨   x <P2 y  
 
Definition 12 Linear sum preferences 
For single attributes A1 and A2 such that A1 ≠ A2 and dom(A1) ∩ dom(A2) = ∅ we assume P1 = (A1, <P1) and 
P2 = (A2, <P2), implying that P1 and P2 are disjoint preferences. For a new attribute name A we define dom(A) 
:= dom(A1) ∪ dom(A2). Then P = (A, <P1⊕P2)  is called  linear sum preference, if:    
x <P1⊕P2 y   iff   x <P1 y  ∨   x <P2 y  ∨  (x ∈ dom(A2)  ∧  y ∈ dom(A1)) 
 
Linear sum ‘⊕’ can be viewed as a convenient design and proof method for base preference constructors. With 
the right understanding of  ‘other-values’ (cmp. Definition 6) we can informally state: 
- A POS-preference constructor can be characterized as the linear sum of the anti-chain preference on the 
POS-set followed by the anti-chain preference on the other values:    POS = POS-set↔ ⊕ other-values↔  
- POS/NEG = (POS-set↔ ⊕ other-values↔) ⊕ NEG-set↔  
- POS/POS = (POS1-set↔ ⊕ POS2-set↔) ⊕ other-values↔ 
- EXPLICIT = E ⊕ other-values↔  
                      
At this point we can summarize all results stated so far as follows, referring back to Definition 5: 
Proposition 1 Each preference term defines a preference. 
 
This proposition gives us the grand freedom to flexibly and intuitively combine multiple preferences according 
to the specific requirements in an application situation. Let’s coin the notion of preference engineering and 
demonstrate its potentials by a typical scenario from B2C e-commerce. 
 
Example 6 Preference engineering scenario 
Suppose that Julia wants to buy a used car for shared usage by herself and her friend Leslie. Contemplating 
about her personal customer preferences, she comes up with this wish list: 
 P1 = (Category, <P1) :=   POS/POS(Category, POS-set1{cabriolet}; POS-set2{roadster}) 
 P2 = (Transmission, <P2) :=   POS(Transmission, POS-SET{automatic}) 
 P3 = (Horsepower, <P3) :=   AROUND(Horsepower, 100) 
 P4 = (Price, <P4)  :=   LOWEST(Price) 
 P5 = (Color, <P6) :=   NEG(Color, NEG-set{gray}) 
Then Julia decides about the relative importance of these single preferences:  
 Q1 = ({Color, Category, Transmission, Horsepower, Price}, <Q1) := P5 & ((P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ P3) & P4) 
Julia communicates this wish list to her car dealer Michael, who adds general domain knowledge P6 about cars:  
 P6 = (Year-of-construction, <P6) :=    HIGHEST(Year-of-construction) 
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In general, any piece of ontological knowledge can be entered at this stage. Because also vendors have their 
preferences, of course, Michael has another preference P7 of its own: 
 P7 = (Commission, <P7) :=   HIGHEST(Commission) 
Since Michael is a fair play guy, the query he is going to issue against his used car database is this: 
 Q2 = ({Color, Category, Transmission, Horsepower, Price, Year-of-construction, Commission}, <Q2)
      :=   (Q1 & P6) & P7 = ((P5 & ((P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ P3) & P4)) & P6) & P7  
Note that when mixing customer with vendor preferences Michael had not to worry that potential preference 
conflicts would crash his used car e-shop. Just before Michael queries his car database against Q2 Leslie enters 
the scene. A short discussion with Julia reveals that Leslie has a different color taste: 
 P8 = (Color, <P8) := POS/NEG(Color, POS-set{blue}; NEG-set{gray, red}) 
In addition, Leslie convinces Julia that money should matter as much as color. Consequently, Q1 adapted to 
these new preferences reads as follows: 
 Q1* = ({Color, Category, Transmission, Horsepower, Price}, <Q1) := (P5⊗P8⊗P4) & (P1⊗P2⊗P3) 
Finally Michael poses the adapted complex preference query Q2* … and the story might end that everybody is 
happy with the result.                ☺ 
3.4 Preference hierarchies 
Preference constructors can be arranged in hierarchies. Given constructors C1 and C2,  we call C1 a preference 
sub-constructor of C2 (C1 ≼ C2), if the definition of C1 can be gained from the definition of C2 by some spe-
cializing constraints. Basically we can state three hierarchies, where the latter will be proved later on. 
 
• Hierarchy of non-numerical base preference constructors: 
- POS/POS ≼EXPLICIT, if EXPLICIT-graph = (POS1-set)↔ ⊕ (POS2-set) ↔  
- POS ≼ POS/POS, if POS2-set = ∅ 
- POS ≼ POS/NEG, if NEG-set = ∅ 
- NEG ≼ POS/NEG, if POS-set = ∅ 
 
• Hierarchy of numerical base preference constructors: (‘N’ means ‘numeric’) 
- BETWEEN ≼ SCORE, if A is ‘N’ and f(x) = − distance(x, [low, up]) 
- AROUND ≼ BETWEEN, if low = up 
- HIGHEST ≼ SCORE, if A is ‘N’ and f(x) = x 
- LOWEST ≼ SCORE, if A is ‘N’ and f(x) = −x 
 
• Hierarchy of complex preference constructors:  ‘♦’ ≼ ‘⊗’ 
 
These sub-constructor hierarchies can be visualized as follows: 
   POS/NEG EXPLICIT              SCORE                   ‘⊗’     rank(F)  
 
  NEG  POS/POS BETWEEN   LOWEST   HIGHEST              ‘♦’ ‘&’ 
 
    POS     AROUND 
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There is certainly space for more sub-constructor relationships. For example, a super-constructor of both 
POS/NEG and EXPLICIT would be a constructor with two explicit graphs, say POS-graph and NEG-graph, 
assembled by linear sums in analogy to POS/NEG. An obvious possibility is to verify  that ‘&’ ≼ rank(F) holds 
by determining a properly weighted  F. 
 
Since we have specialization by constraints, this sub-constructor hierarchy is taxonomic. Besides the usual ad-
vantages for software engineering this also economizes proof efforts: Strict partial order semantics must be veri-
fied only for top-level preference constructors. Further we assume the principle of constructor substitutability, 
i.e. instead of a requested constructor also a sub-constructor can be supplied. For instance, rank(F)(P1, P2) re-
quires that P1 and P2 are SCORE preferences. Instead, we can e.g. also supply preferences P1 and P2 con-
structed by AROUND and HIGHEST, respectively. 
4 A preference algebra 
Hard constraints in database systems are basically formulated by first order logic formulas, which can be ma-
nipulated by Boolean algebra. On the other hand preferences, represented by preference terms,  will be used to 
express soft constraints. Therefore it is desirable to develop a preference algebra that can prove laws amongst 
preference terms. The subsequent studies will also strengthen our previous propositions about the intuitive se-
mantics of preference constructors. First we need a notion of  equivalence of preference terms. 
 
Definition 13 Equivalence of preference terms 
P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2) are equivalent (P1 ≡ P2), if A1 = A2 and if for all x and y ∈ dom(A1):
 x  <P1  y   iff   x  <P2  y  
 
If P1 ≡ P2, then the preference terms P1 and P2 can be syntactically different, but the preferences represented by 
P1 and P2, resp., are actually the same.  
4.1 A collection of algebraic laws 
The next proposition is covered by [DaP90].  
 
Proposition 2 Commutative and associative laws for preference terms 
b) Pareto accumulation:  P1 ⊗ P2 ≡ P2 ⊗ P1, (P1 ⊗ P2) ⊗ P3  ≡ P1 ⊗ (P2 ⊗ P3) 
c) Prioritized accumulation:     (P1 & P2) & P3  ≡ P1 & (P2 & P3) 
d) Intersection aggregation:   P1 ♦ P2 ≡ P2 ♦ P1, (P1 ♦ P2) ♦ P3  ≡ P1 ♦ (P2 ♦ P3) 
e) Disjoint union aggregation:   P1 + P2  ≡ P2 + P1, (P1 + P2) + P3    ≡ P1 + (P2 + P3) 
f) Linear sum aggregation:     (P1 ⊕ P2) ⊕ P3  ≡ P1 ⊕ (P2 ⊕ P3) 
For numerical accumulation the existence of such algebraic laws depends on the mathematical properties of F.  
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Proposition 3 Further laws for preference terms 
Dual preferences:               a)      (S↔)∂   ≡  S↔ for any set S           b)  (P∂)∂  ≡  P 
        c)      (P1⊕P2)∂  ≡  P2∂  ⊕ P1∂             d)   HIGHEST ≡ LOWEST∂ 
       e)      POS∂  ≡  NEG,  NEG∂   ≡  POS  if POS-set = NEG-set 
Intersection aggregation:    f)      P ♦ P   ≡  P                                 g)     P ♦ Pδ  ≡  P ♦ A↔  ≡  A↔   if  P = (A, <P) 
Prioritized accumulation:   h)     If P1 and P2 are chains, then P1&P2 and P2&P1 are chains 
  i)     P & P   ≡  P & P∂   ≡  P                 j)     P & A↔  ≡ P     if P = (A, <P) 
  k)    A↔&P   ≡  A↔   if P = (A, <P) 
Pareto accumulation:           l)     P ⊗ P   ≡  P                                  m)    A↔⊗P  ≡  A↔&P   
  n)    P ⊗ A↔  ≡  P ⊗ P∂  ≡  A↔  if  P = (A, <P)  
 
These laws are easy to obtain and they all match our intuitive expectations about the semantics of preferences. 
E.g., let’s pick P ⊗ P∂  ≡  A↔: Since P and P∂ are equally important, in case of conflicts for values x and y none 
of them prevails, instead x and y remain unranked. Because P and P∂ are in conflict everywhere, the full domain 
becomes unranked, hence the anti-chain A↔. Unranked values are a natural reservoir to negotiate compromises.  
4.2 Decomposition of prioritized and Pareto preferences 
The following “discrimination” theorem corresponds to the intuitive semantics of prioritized accumulation. We 
succeed to decompose ‘&’ into disjoint union aggregation. 
 
Proposition 4 “Discrimination” theorem for P1&P2: 
      (a)     P1&P2   ≡  P1    if  P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2) 
      (b)     P1&P2   ≡  P1 + (A1↔&P2)    if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅    
Proof: See appendix. 
 
In both cases P1 is fully respected. For shared attributes P2 is completely dominated by P1. In case of disjoint 
attributes P1 is more important than P2, because P2 is respected only inside groups of equal A1-values, hence 
not disturbing P1’s ‘better-than’ decisions on A1. In this intuitive sense P1 discriminates against P2. 
Now we state the important “non-discrimination” theorem for Pareto accumulation, which likewise nicely sup-
ports our intuitive semantics for P = P1 ⊗ P2.   
 
Proposition 5 “Non-discrimination” theorem:   P1 ⊗ P2  ≡  (P1 & P2) ♦ (P2 & P1) 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
Preferences P1 and P2 are indeed treated equally important by ‘⊗’, since both P1 and P2 are each given prime 
importance by ‘&’. Any arising conflict is resolved in a non-discriminating way by intersection ‘♦’. 
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Example 7 “Non-discrimination” theorem 
Let’s assume P1 = LOWEST(Price), P2 = LOWEST(Mileage) and a Pareto preference P = ({Price, Mileage}, 
<P1⊗P2). We consider this set Car-DB of values from dom(Price) × dom(Mileage): 
Car-DB = {val1 = (40000, 15000), val2 = (35000, 30000), val3 = (20000, 10000), 
                              val4 = (15000, 35000), val5 = (15000, 30000)} 
The ‘better-than’ graph of P =  P1⊗P2 for subset Car-DB is this (gained e.g. by exhaustive better-than tests): 
Level 1:   val3 val5   
 
 Level 2:  val1 val2 val4 
On the other hand let’s determine (P1&P2) ♦ (P2&P1): 
The ‘better-than’ graph of P’ = P1&P2 for subset Car-DB yields a chain as follows: 
val5  →  val4  →  val3  →  val2  →  val1 
The ‘better-than graph’ of P’’ = P2&P1 for subset Car-DB yields a chain as follows: 
val3  →  val1  →  val5  →  val2  →  val4 
The ‘better-than’ graph of P’♦ P’’ for subset Car-DB is the same as for P1⊗P2. Note that it matches exactly the 
set of ‘better-than’ relationships that are shared by P’ and P’’.              ☺ 
 
Proposition 6 P1⊗P2  ≡  P1♦P2    if P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2) 
Proof: : Direct corollary from Proposition 5 and Proposition 4 a). Thus ♦ is a preference sub-constructor of ⊗.  
5 Evaluation of preference queries 
If we look at SQL databases, then life is comparably simple there. Queries against a database set R are formu-
lated as hard constraints, leading to an all-or-nothing behavior: If the desired values are in R, you get exactly 
what you were asking for, otherwise you get nothing at all. We call the latter deficiency the empty-result prob-
lem. Thus the exact-match query model can become a real nuisance in many e/m-commerce applications. The 
other extreme happens, if  - being afraid of empty results - the query is built by means of disjunctive subqueries. 
Then one is frequently inundated with lots of irrelevant query results. This is the notorious flooding-effect. 
 
The real world, where wishes are expressed as preferences, neither follows a simple all-or-nothing paradigm nor 
do people expect to be flooded with irrelevant values to choose from. Instead, a more intelligent and cooperative 
answer semantics of preference queries is urgently needed. Whether preferences (i.e. wishes) can be satisfied 
and to what extent depends on the current status of the real world. Thus we have to perform a suitable  match-
making between wishes and reality.  To this purpose we now define the so-called BMO query model. 
5.1 Preference queries and the BMO query model 
Preferences are defined in terms of values from dom(A), which represent the universe of a fictitious world 
(realm of wishes). In database applications we assume that the real world is mapped into appropriate database 
instances which we call database sets. The database set R may, e.g., be a view or a base relation in an SQL data-
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base or a DTD-instance in an XML database. Under the usual closed world assumption database sets capture the 
currently valid or accessible state of the real world. Thus database sets are proper subsets of our domains of 
values, hence they are subset preferences.  
 
Consider a database set R(B1, B2, …, Bm). Given A = {A1, A2,  …, Ak}, where each Aj denotes an attribute Bi 
from R,  let R[A] := R[A1, A2, … Ak] denote the projection π of R onto these k attributes. 
Definition 14 Database preference PR, perfect match for P in R 
Let’s assume P = (A, <P), where A = {A1, A2,  …, Ak}.  
a)  Each R[A] ⊆ dom(A) defines a subset preference P⊆. We call it a database preference and denote it by:
  PR = (R[A], <P) 
b)  Tuple t ∈ R is a perfect match in a database set R, if:  t[A] ∈ max(P)  ∧  t[A] ∈ R 
 
Comparing max(P), i.e. the dream objects of P, with the set max(PR), i.e. the best objects available in the real 
world, then there might be no overlap. But if so, we have a perfect match between wishes and reality. If t is a 
perfect match for P in R, then t[A] ∈ max(PR). But the converse does not hold in general. Preference queries 
perform a match-making between the stated preferences (wishes) and the database preferences (reality). 
 
Definition 15 Declarative semantics of  a preference query σ[P](R),    BMO query model 
Let’s assume P = (A, <P) and a database preference PR. We define a  preference query σ[P](R) declaratively as 
follows:  σ[P](R) = {t ∈ R | t[A] ∈ max(PR)} 
 
A preference query σ[P](R) evaluates P against a database set R by retrieving all maximal values from PR. Note 
that not all of them are necessarily perfect matches of P. Thus the principle of query relaxation is implicit in 
above definition. Furthermore, any non-maximal values of PR are excluded from the query result, hence can be 
considered as discarded on the fly. In this sense all best matching tuples – and only those – are retrieved by a 
preference query. Therefore we coin the term BMO query model (“Best Matches Only”). 
 
Example 8 BMO query model 
We revisit the EXPLICIT preference P of Example 1 and pose the query σ[P](R) for R(Color) = {yellow, red, 
green, black}. The BMO result is: σ[P](R) = {yellow, red}. Note that red is a perfect match.               ☺ 
 
The next proposition is straightforward, but important to state. 
Proposition 7 If P1 ≡ P2, then for all R:   σ[P1](R)  =  σ[P2](R) 
Besides preferences queries of the form σ[P](R) a variation will be needed frequently, which originates from an 
interesting interplay between grouping and anti-chains. To this purpose consider the preference query 
σ[A↔&P](R), where P = (B, <P): 
We have : x <A↔&P  y   iff   x1 <A↔  y1  ∨  (x1 = y1  ∧  x2 <P  y2)   
                     iff   false  ∨  (x1 = y1  ∧  x2 <P  y2)   iff   x1 = y1  ∧  x2 <P  y2   
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Then:        t ∈ σ[A↔&P](R)    iff     t[A, B] ∈ max((A↔&P)R) 
               iff    ∀ v[A, B] ∈ R[A, B]:  ¬(t[A, B] <A↔&P  v[A, B])  
            iff    ∀ v[A, B] ∈ R[A, B]:  ¬(  t[A] = v[A]  ∧  t[B] <P v[B]) 
In operational terms this characterizes a grouping of R by equal A-values, evaluating for each group Gi of tuples 
the preference query σ[A↔&P](Gi). This motivates the following definition. 
 
Definition 16 Declarative semantics of σ[P groupby A](R) 
Let’s assume  P = (B, <P) and a database preference PR. We declaratively define a preference query with 
grouping σ[P groupby A](R) as follows:    σ[P groupby A](R)  :=  σ[A↔&P](R)  
 
Compared to hard selection queries, preference selection queries deviate from the logics behind hard selections: 
Preference queries are always non-monotonic.  
Example 9 Non-monotonicity of preference query results 
Let’s consider P = HIGHEST(Fuel_Economy) ⊗ HIGHEST(Insurance_Rating). We successively evaluate 
σ[P](Cars) for Cars(Fuel_Economy, Insurance_Rating, Nickname) as follows: 
   Cars = {(100, 3, frog), (50, 3, cat)}:                     σ[P](R) = {(100, 3, frog)} 
   Cars = {(100, 3, frog), (50, 3, cat) (50, 10, shark)}:   σ[P](R) = {(100, 3, frog), (50, 10, shark)} 
   Cars = {(100, 3, frog), (50, 3, cat) (50, 10, shark), (100, 10, turtle)}:  σ[P](R) = {(100, 10, turtle)}                 ☺ 
 
The non-monotonic behavior is obvious: Though we added more and more tuples to Cars, the results of our 
preference queries did not exhibit a similar behavior. Instead of adapting to the size of the database set Cars, 
query results of σ[P](R) adapted to the quality of data in Cars.                
The explanation is intuitive: Being ‘better than’ is not a property of a single value, rather it concerns compari-
sons between pairs of values. Therefore it is sensitive (holistic) to the quality of a collection of values, and not to 
its sheer quantity. Thus “quality instead of quantity” is the name of the game for BMO queries. Or considered 
from a different perspective, better data imply better query results. As it is always the case in the real world, the 
law of energy preservation applies here, too: Evaluation of preference queries is potentially more expensive than 
of hard selection queries, because non-monotonic logics leads to more complex evaluation algorithms in general.  
 
Thus one key challenge of preference query evaluation is to find efficient algorithms for complex preference 
constructors. For a Pareto preference, e.g, the naïve approach performs O(n2) ‘better-than’ tests, if the database 
set R has n tuples. For the scope of this paper, however, we do not explicitly address efficiency issues, instead 
we provide fundamental decomposition results that can form the basis for a divide-and-conquer approach pur-
sued by a preference query optimizer. 
5.2 Evaluation of disjoint union and intersection aggregation 
Our goal is to decompose the accumulation preference constructors ‘&’ and ‘⊗’ into aggregation accumulation 
using ‘+’ and ‘♦’, which in turn can be decomposed further.  
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Proposition 8 σ[P1+P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2](R) 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
The evaluation of intersection aggregation will cause more headaches. First we need some technical definitions. 
Definition 17 Nmax(PR),  P↑v,   YY(P1, P2)R 
a) Given P = (A, <P) and a database preference PR, the set of non-maximal values Nmax(PR) is defined as: 
         Nmax(PR)  :=  R[A] − max(PR) 
b) Given v ∈ dom(A), the following set is called ‘better than’ set of v in P:   P↑v  := {w ∈ dom(A): v <P w} 
c) YY(P1, P2)R := {t ∈ R : t[A] ∈ Nmax(P1R) ∩ Nmax(P2R)  ∧  P1↑t[A]  ∩  P2↑t[A]  =  ∅} 
In the terminology of [DaP90] Nmax(PR) is a down-set (or order ideal), whereas max(PR) is an up-set (or order 
filter). Likewise, P↑v  is an up-set. 
Proposition 9 σ[P1♦P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∪  σ[P2](R)  ∪  YY(P1, P2)R 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
Efficiently evaluating YY(P1, P2)R is a difficult recursive task in general. Therefore it is an interesting future 
challenge to figure out conditions under which YY(P1, P2)R can be simplified. 
5.3 Evaluation of prioritized accumulation 
Next we investigate σ[P1&P2](R). Since P1&P2 ≡ P1 for shared attributes (Proposition 4 a) we assume A1 ∩ 
A2 = ∅. The evaluation of prioritized accumulation can be done by grouping. 
Proposition 10 σ[P1&P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2 groupby A1](R), if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ 
Proof: Let P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2). From Proposition 4 b, Proposition 8 and Definition 16 we get: 
σ[P1&P2](R)  =  σ[P1+(A1↔&P2)](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[A1↔&P2)](R) 
                             =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2 groupby A1](R)   Q.e.d. 
Example 10 Evaluation of a prioritized accumulation query 
We assume P1 = Make↔ , P2 = AROUND(Price, 40000) and this database set Cars(Make, Price, Oid): 
 Cars = {(Audi, 40000, 1), (BMW, 35000, 2), (VW, 20000, 3), (BMW, 50000, 4)} 
The informal query “For each make give me an offer with a price around 40000” translates into: 
 σ[P1&P2](Cars)  =  σ[P1](Cars)  ∩  σ[P2 groupby Make](Cars) 
   =  Cars  ∩  {(Audi, 40000, 1), (BMW, 35000, 2), (VW, 20000, 3)} 
   =  {(Audi, 40000, 1), (BMW, 35000, 2), (VW, 20000, 3)}       ☺ 
Proposition 11 σ[P1&P2](R)  =  σ[P2](σ[P1](R)) , if P1 is a chain  
Proof: If P1 is a chain, all tuples in σ[P1](R) have the same A1-value. Then  Proposition 10 specializes as stated. 
Thus a cascade of preference queries is a special case of a prioritized preference query, if P1 is a chain. 
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5.4 Evaluation of Pareto accumulation 
Now we state the main decomposition theorem for the evaluation of Pareto preference queries. 
Proposition 12  σ[P1⊗P2](R)   =  (σ[P1](R) ∩ σ[P2 groupby A1](R))  ∪  
                                          (σ[P2](R) ∩ σ[P1 groupby A2](R))  ∪ YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R 
 
Proof: Due to Proposition 5,  Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 we get: 
      σ[P1⊗P2](R)  =  σ[(P1&P2) ♦ (P2&P1)](R)   
               =  σ[P1&P2](R)  ∪  σ[P2&P1](R) ∪ YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R 
               =  (σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2 groupby A1](R))  ∪  
            (σ[P2](R)  ∩  σ[P1 groupby A2](R))  ∪  YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R  Q.e.d. 
 
This theorem gives a good insight into the structure of the Pareto-optimal set σ[P1⊗P2](R), re-enforcing also our 
claim that ‘⊗’ treats P1 and P2 as equally important: 
- The first term contains all maximal values of (P1&P2)R. 
- The 2nd term contains all maximal values of (P2&P1)R. 
- The 3rd term contains values that are neither maximal in (P1&P2)R nor in (P2&P1)R. 
Note that if P1 or P2 is a chain, then Proposition 11 can be applied to speed up evaluation. 
 
Example 11 Evaluation of Pareto accumulation 
Assume P1 = LOWEST(A),  the dual preference P2 = HIGHEST(A) and R(A) = {3, 6, 9}. We compute 
σ[P1⊗P2](R). Due to Proposition 6, Proposition 3d, g) we immediately know: 
 σ[P1⊗P2](R)   =  σ[P1♦P2](R)  =  σ[P1♦P1∂](R)  =  σ[A↔](R)  =  R  
To countercheck, since both P1 and P2 are chains Proposition 12 specializes as follows: 
σ[P1⊗P2](R)   =  σ[P2](σ[P1](R))  ∪   σ[P1](σ[P2](R))  ∪  YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R  
             =   {3}  ∪  {9}  ∪  YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R 
We have:   Nmax((P1&P2)R)  ∩  Nmax((P2&P1)R)  =  {6, 9} ∩ {3, 6} = {6}  
Since      P1&P2↑6  ∩  P2&P1↑6  =  {3} ∩ {9} =  ∅, we get YY(P1&P2, P2&P1)R = {6} 
Thus we finally arrive at:   σ[P1⊗P2](R)  =  {3}  ∪  {9}  ∪  {6}  =  R           ☺ 
5.5 Filter effect of Pareto accumulation 
Preference queries under the BMO query model avoid both the empty-result effect and the flooding effect with 
irrelevant results. We want to study how the filter effect of a Pareto preference can be characterized. 
Definition 18 Result size 
Let P = (A, <P). The result size of σ[P](R) is defined as: size(P, R)  :=  card(πA(σ[P](R))  =  card(max(PR)) 
 
Size(P, R) counts the number of different A-values appearing in the result of a preference query under the BMO 
query model. Obviously if card(R) > 0, then  1 ≤ size(P, R) ≤ card(πA(R)).  
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Definition 19 Strength of a preference filter 
Given P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2), we say that P1 is a stronger preference filter than P2, if size(P1, R) ≤ 
size(P2, R). Conversely, P2 is said to be a weaker preference filter than P1. Note that  ‘stronger than’ is a (non-
strict) partial order on the set of all preferences, given A and R.  
Proposition 13 Result sizes of complex preferences 
a) size(P1+P2, R)  ≤  size(P1, R),   size(P1+P2, R)  ≤  size(P2, R) 
b) size(P1♦P2, R)  ≥  size(P1, R),   size(P1♦P2, R)  ≥  size(P2, R) 
c) size(P1&P2, R)  ≤  size(P1, R) 
d) size(P1⊗P2, R)  ≥  size(P1&P2, R),   size(P1⊗P2, R)  ≥  size(P2&P1, R) 
 
Proof: 
a)  Let P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2), where P1and P2 are disjoint preferences. From Proposition 8 we get: 
size(P1+P2, R)  =  card(πA(σ[P1+P2](R)))  =  card(πA(σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2](R))) 
            ≤  card(πA(σ[P1](R)))  =  size(P1, R) 
b)  Let P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2). Then due to Proposition 9 we get: 
size(P1♦P2, R)  =  card(πA(σ[P1♦P2](R))) =  card(πA(σ[P1](R)  ∪  σ[P2](R)  ∪  YY(P1, P2)R)) 
             ≥  card(πA(σ[P1](R)))  =  size(P1, R) 
c)  Let P1 = (A1, <P1), P2 = (A2, <P2) and A = A1 ∪ A2. Then due to Proposition 10 we get: 
size(P1&P2, R)  =  card(πA(σ[P1&P2](R)))  =  card(πA(σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2 groupby A1](R))) 
             ≤  card(πA(σ[P1](R)))  =  size(P1, R) 
d)  Let P1 = (A1, <P1) and P1 = (A2, <P1). Then due to Proposition 5 and Proposition 13 b) we get: 
size(P1⊗P2, R)  =  size((P1&P2)♦(P2&P1), R)  ≥  size(P1&P2, R) 
Since ‘+’, ‘♦’ and ‘⊗’ are commutative, the remaining inequalities holds, too.    Q.e.d. 
 
Using the  notation “P ⇛ Q iff  P is a stronger preference filter than Q, given A and R”, we thus can state: 
P1+P2 ⇛ P1, P1+P2 ⇛ P2, P1 ⇛ P1♦P2, P2 ⇛ P1♦P2, P1&P2 ⇛ P1, 
P1&P2 ⇛ P1⊗P2, P2&P1 ⇛ P1⊗P2 
We want to interpret the filter effect of Pareto accumulation in a rough analogy to the Boolean ‘AND/OR’-
programming of search engines using an exact match query model. We have: 
 P1⊗P2  ⇚  P1&P2  ⇛  P1, P1⊗P2  ⇚  P2&P1  ⇛  P2 
This behavior justifies the following interpretation: Seen from the perspective of P1 and P2, resp., forming 
P1&P2 and P2&P1 has a stronger filter effect, hence resembling ‘AND’ operations in the exact match query 
model. Then continuing to form P1⊗P2  has a weaker filter effect, hence resembling ‘OR’ operations in the 
exact match query model. Since the BMO query model automatically adapts to the quality of the database set R, 
as a net effect we get an automatic ‘AND/OR’-like filter effect of Pareto accumulation. 
 
This is an important observation compared to search engines with an exact match query model, struggling to 
combat the empty-result nuisance and the flooding effect. There are work-arounds  that attempt to mitigate this, 
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e.g. parametric search, which basically is a semi-automatic, repetitive attempt of query refinement. The other 
countermeasure is the so-called ‘expert mode’, offering a Boolean query interface with logical AND, OR and 
NOT operations. However, this approach has been known as inadequate for a long time ([VGB61]). BMO data-
bases take all this burden from the user by automatically and adaptively finding the best possible answers. 
6 Practical aspects 
Now we show how our complex  preference model fits into database and Internet practice.  
6.1 Integration into SQL and XML 
The early origins that eventually led to the contributions of this paper trace back to [KiG94], proposing a deduc-
tive approach to programming with preferences as partial orders. The theory of subsumption lattices in [KKT95] 
can provide the formal backbone guaranteeing the existence of a model theory and a corresponding fixpoint 
theory with subsumption in general deductive databases. Subsumption lattices generalize the usual powerset 
lattices of Herbrand models to arbitrary partial orders. In turn, Herbrand models, representing the exact match 
query model, are a special case of subsumption models. As a consequence this meets one crucial point from our 
introductory list of desiderata: We can compatibly extend declarative database query languages under an exact 
query model, which includes object-relational SQL databases and XML databases, by preferences under a BMO 
query model. 
 
• Preference SQL 
The product Preference SQL, whose first release was available already in the fall of 1999, has been the first 
instance of an extension of SQL by preferences as strict partial orders. No publications have been released in the 
past, but recently [KiK01] gives an overview. Preference SQL implements a plug-and-go application integration 
by a clever rewriting of Preference SQL queries into SQL92 code, making it available e.g. on DB2, Oracle 8i 
and the MS SQL Server. Preference SQL is in commercial use as Preference Search cartridge for INTERSHOP 
e-commerce platforms. The preference model implemented covers all previous base preference constructors, 
Pareto accumulation (‘AND’) and cascading preferences. Preferences can be applied following a new PREFER-
RING clause. Here are two self-explaining examples: 
 
SELECT * FROM car WHERE make = ‘Opel’
PREFERRING(category = 'roadster' ELSE category <> 'passenger' AND
price AROUND 40000 AND HIGHEST(power))
CASCADE color = 'red' CASCADE LOWEST(mileage);
SELECT * FROM trips
PREFERRING start_date AROUND '2001/11/23' AND duration AROUND 14
BUT ONLY DISTANCE(start_date)<=2 AND DISTANCE(duration)<=2;
The quality functions LEVEL and DISTANCE can supervise required quality levels (BUT ONLY clause) and can 
be exploited for advanced query explanation. In [KFH01], describing experiences from a smart meta-comparison 
shop using Preference SQL, benchmarks from real customer queries show that typical result sizes of Pareto pref-
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erences under BMO query semantics ranged from a few to a few dozens, which is exactly what’s required in 
shopping situations. 
 
• Preference XPATH 
Preference XPATH ([KHF01]) is a query language to build personalized query engines in an attribute-rich XML 
environment. It implements the full presented preference model (currently up rank(F)), the prototype runs on the 
native XML database system TAMINO from Software AG and on XALAN. Standard XPATH is compatibly 
extended as follows: The production “LocationStep: axis nodetest predicate*” is upgraded as 
“LocationStep: axis nodetest(predicate|preference)*”. To delimit a hard selection (i.e. 
predicate) XPATH uses the symbols ‘[‘ and ‘]‘. For soft selections (i.e. preference) ‘#[’ and ‘]#’ are 
used. Here are two sample queries, where Pareto accumulation is written as ‘AND’ and prioritized accumulation 
is expressed by ‘PRIOR TO’: 
 
  Q1: /CARS/CAR #[(@fuel_economy)highest and (@horsepower)highest]#
Q2: /CARS/CAR #[(@color)in("black", "white")prior to(@price)around 10000]#
#[(@mileage)lowest]# 
Preference XPATH can be applied in other XML key technologies like XSLT, Xpointer or Xquery. 
 
• The ‘skyline of’ clause 
A restricted form of Pareto accumulation is the ‘SKYLINE OF’ clause proposed in [BKS01]. It is a non-strict 
variant for specifying P = P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ … ⊗ Pk, where each Pi must be a  LOWEST or  HIGHEST preference, 
hence a chain. Efficient evaluation algorithms have been given in [KLP75], [BKS01] and [TEO01]. 
6.2 The ranked query model 
Soft constraints implemented by numerical accumulation rank(F) are in use today in several database and infor-
mation retrieval applications.  
 
• Multi-feature query engines 
One typical use is in multi-feature query engines to rank objects according to a complex technical features, e.g. 
to support queries by image content on color, texture or shape. Since rank(F) constructs chain preferences in 
most cases,  a BMO-query semantics would return exactly one best-matching object. Definitely, this is a too 
small set to choose from in general. For more alternative choices, the “k-best” query model is applied, returning 
k objects with a (user-)definable k. In BMO-terms this amounts to retrieve some non-maximal objects, too. 
There is already the SQL/MM proposal for incorporating multi-feature queries into SQL. Algorithms like Quick-
Combine ([GBK00, BGK00]) can be used to speed up the computation of rank(F) under the “k-best” semantics.  
 
• Full-text search engines 
Another area are full-text search engines, where search keywords can be understood as special preferences, each 
yielding a numerical score indicating their relevance. The combining function F for rank(F) is typically some 
 23
monotonic scalar product employing the cosine function, if the classical vector space model from information 
retrieval is used. SQL has been extended by a text cartridge (Oracle 8i), a text extender (DB2) or text datablade 
(Informix), implementing a k-best query model. The XXL prototype of [ThW00] is a representative of providing 
the k-best semantics in the XML context. 
 
Let’s spend a word on the issue of non-numerical vs. numerical ranking or of attribute-based search vs. full-text 
search: If efficient implementations of the full preference model are available, then there are much more options 
how to model preferences in a given application, ranging from purely non-numerical to purely numerical and any 
combinations in between. For instance, an interesting combination of attribute-rich search and full-text search 
would be a synthesis of Preference XPATH and XXL. Likewise Preference SQL merges well with SQL and 
ranked text (cartridges, extenders, datablades). Ranked text itself may be one feature in a multi-feature query. 
Theoretically it may be the case that numerical ranking subsumes all other preferences (which amounts to prove 
that every preference constructor is a sub-constructor of  SCORE or rank(F)). However, it is preferable to sup-
port a plurality of preference constructors: Identify as many preference constructors as possible that (1) fre-
quently occur in the real world, (2) have an intuitive semantics and (3) possess efficient evaluation algorithms. 
7 Summary and outlook 
We presented a preference model which is tailored for database systems. Many requirements of a personalized 
real world are met by preferences modeled as strict partial orders: It unifies non-numerical and numerical rank-
ing, it has an intuitive semantics that is understood by everybody and it can be mapped directly into a well-
developed mathematical framework. This preference model features a variety of preference constructors that are 
frequently needed in practice. In particular we introduced Pareto accumulation for equally important preferences 
and prioritized accumulation for ordered importance among preferences. Intended for technical assembly we 
showed that the preference constructors of disjoint union, linear sum and intersection aggregation fit into this 
framework, too. This wide spectrum of options to model preferences opens the door for a systematic approach to 
preference engineering, where preferences can be combined inductively, including situations where they come 
from different parties with potentially conflicting intentions. Such a preference mix may be comprised of subjec-
tive preferences from daily life experiences, driven by personal intentions, and of sophisticated technical prefer-
ences. Various portions of the presented preference model have already been prototyped or are in commercial 
use in SQL or XML environments. Despite this vast application scope, preferences as strict partial orders possess 
an almost Spartan formal basis. This simplicity in turn is the key for a preference algebra, where many laws are 
valid that are of interest for a preference optimizer. We have given a collection of laws which all have an intui-
tive interpretation, a key proposition being the non-discrimination theorem for Pareto accumulation. This formal 
basis enabled us to define the declarative semantics of preference queries under the BMO query model, which 
can cope with the notorious empty-result and flooding problems of search engine technology. Moreover, we 
succeeded to present fundamental decomposition theorems for the evaluation of Pareto and of prioritized prefer-
ence queries. Beyond the scope of this paper, however, has been the issue of efficiency of preference query 
evaluation. Due to the inherent non-monotonic nature of preference queries,  this is a major challenge. 
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Our roadmap into a “Preference World” includes the following investigations: A persistent preference reposi-
tory, personalized query composition methods, preference mining from query log files, a preference query opti-
mizer (e.g. heuristic transformations like ‘push preference’, cost-based optimization to choose between direct 
implementations of the Pareto operator and divide & conquer algorithms exploiting the decomposition princi-
ples, or the use of index methods for efficient ‘better-than’ testing). The conflict tolerance of our preference 
model forms the basis for research concerned with e-negotiations and e-haggling. Finally, we work on enhance-
ments of our preference model to incorporate additional intuitive semantic features. Eventually in a Preference 
World technologies comparable to the exact-match world should become available, ranging from E/R/Preference 
modeling to efficient and scalable preference query languages for SQL and XML. 
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Appendix: 
 
(A)   “Discrimination” theorem for P1&P2: 
(a) P1&P2   ≡  P1    if  P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2) 
 (b) P1&P2  ≡  P1 + (A1↔&P2)    if A1 ∩ A2 = ∅    
 
Proof:  
 (a) Let P1 = (A, <P1) and P2 = (A, <P2). Then P1&P2  =  (A , <P1&P2). For x, y ∈ dom(A) we get: 
x <P1&P2 y   iff   x <P1 y   ∨   (x = y  ∧  x <P2 y)   iff   x <P1 y   ∨   false   iff   x <P1 y  
 
(b) Let P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2) where A1 ∩ A2 = ∅.  For x = (x1, x2), y = (y1, y2) ∈ dom(A1) × 
dom(A2) let x <P1* y  iff  x1 <P1 y1. Then P1 is an order embedding into P1* = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1*).  
Since A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, P1* and P2 are disjoint preferences, hence P1* and A1↔&P2 are disjoint, too. 
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Thus P1* + (A1↔ &P2)  = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1*+(A1↔&P2)) is a disjoint union preference. Now we get: 
x  <P1+(A1↔&P2) y   iff    x  <P1*+(A1↔&P2) y   iff   x1 <P1 y1  ∨   (x  <A1↔&P2  y) 
                    iff   x1 <P1 y1  ∨   (x1 = y1  ∧  x2 <P2  y2)   iff   x  <P1&P2  y      Q.e.d. 
 
 (B)   “Non-discrimination” theorem:   P1 ⊗ P2  ≡  (P1 & P2) ♦ (P2 & P1) 
 
Proof:  
Let P1 = (A1, <P1) and P2 = (A2, <P2).  Then: 
P1 ⊗ P2 = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1⊗P2) 
P1 & P2 = (A1 ∪ A2, <P1&P2), P2 & P1 = (A2 ∪ A1, <P2&P1) 
(P1 & P2) ♦ (P2 & P1) = (A1 ∪ A2, <(P1&P2)♦(P2&P1)) 
Let x = (x1, x2) and y = (y1, y2) ∈ dom(A1) × dom(A2).  For abbreviation let: 
B := ‘x1 <P1 y1’, C := ‘x1 = y1’, D := ‘x2 <P2 y2’, E := ‘x2 = y2’ 
If x = y, then ¬B  ∧ ¬D holds. On the other hand, if x ≠ y, then ¬C ∨ ¬D holds.  (*) 
 
 (1)  x <P1⊗P2 y  iff   (B ∧ (E ∨ D))  ∨ (D ∧ (C ∨ B)) 
                              iff   ((B ∧ E)  ∨  (B ∧ D))  ∨  ((D ∧ C)  ∨  (D ∧ B)) 
                              iff   (B ∧ E)  ∨  (B  ∧ D)  ∨  (D ∧ C) 
 (2)   x <(P1&P2)♦(P2&P1) y  
                              iff   (B ∨ (C ∧ D))  ∧ (D ∨ (E  ∧ B)) 
                              iff   (B ∧ (D  ∨  (E  ∧ B)))  ∨  ((C ∧ D)  ∧  (D ∨  (E  ∧ B)))   
iff   (B ∧ D)  ∨  (B ∧ E  ∧ B)  ∨  (C ∧ D ∧ D)  ∨  ((C  ∧ E)  ∧ D  ∧ B) 
iff   x <P1⊗P2 y  ∨  ((C  ∧ E)  ∧ D  ∧ B)       (**) 
 
Now take a closer look at the last disjunctive term H  :=  C  ∧ E  ∧ D  ∧ B in (**) above: In both cases that x ≠ y 
or x = y, due to (*) ¬H holds. Therefore immediately from Boolean algebra we can continue (**): 
   iff   x <P1⊗P2 y         Q.e.d. 
 
(C) Theorem: σ[P1+P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2](R) 
 
Proof:   Consider P1+P2 = (A, <P1+P2), the database preference (P1+P2)R and w ∈ R[A]: 
w ∈ Nmax((P1+P2)R)   iff   ∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P1+P2 v   iff   ∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P1 v  ∨  w <P2 v 
Since P1 and P2 have to be disjoint preferences, we can continue: 
             iff   (∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P1 v)  ∨  (∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P2 v) 
             iff   w ∈ Nmax(P1R)  ∨   w ∈ Nmax(P2R)  
Thus:   Nmax((P1+P2)R)  =  Nmax(P1R)  ∪  Nmax(P2R) 
Then:       σ[P1+P2](R)  =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ max((P1+P2)R)} 
                     =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ R[A] − Nmax((P1+P2)R)} 
                       =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ R[A] − (Nmax(P1R) ∪  Nmax(P2R))} 
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                         =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ (R[A] − Nmax(P1R))  ∩  (R[A] − Nmax(P2R))} 
                       =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ max(P1R)  ∩  max(P2R)} =  σ[P1](R)  ∩  σ[P2](R)  Q.e.d. 
 
(D) Theorem: σ[P1♦P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∪  σ[P2](R)  ∪  YY(P1, P2)R 
 
Proof:   Consider P1♦P2 = (A, <P1♦P2), the database preference (P1♦P2)R and w ∈ R[A]: 
 w ∈ Nmax((P1♦P2)R)   iff   ∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P1♦P2 v   iff   ∃ v ∈ R[A]:   w <P1 v  ∧  w <P2 v 
At this point we must be careful when distributing the existential quantifier into the conjunction: 
 
  iff   ∃ v, v’ ∈ R[A]:   w <P1 v  ∧  w <P2 v’  ∧   (v ∈ P1↑w  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑w  ∧  v = v’) 
  iff   (∃ v ∈ R[A]:  w <P1 v)  ∧  (∃ v’ ∈ R[A]:  w <P2 v’)  ∧  
               (∃ v ∈ Nmax(P1R), ∃ v’ ∈ Nmax(P2R):  v ∈ P1↑w  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑w  ∧  v = v’) 
  iff   w ∈ Nmax(P1R)  ∧  w ∈ Nmax(P2R)  ∧  
              (∃ v ∈ Nmax(P1R), ∃ v’ ∈ Nmax(P2R):  v ∈ P1↑w  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑w  ∧  v = v’) 
 
Setting      XX(P1, P2)R := {w ∈ R[A]: ∃ v ∈ Nmax(P1R), ∃ v’∈ Nmax(P2R):  v ∈ P1↑w  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑w  ∧  v = v’} 
we continue:       iff   w ∈ Nmax(P1R)  ∧  w ∈ Nmax(P2R)  ∧  w ∈ XX(P1, P2)R 
 
Thus:   Nmax((P1♦P2)R)  =  Nmax(P1R)  ∩  Nmax(P2R)  ∩  XX(P1, P2)R 
 
Then we get: σ[P1♦P2](R)  =  {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ max((P1♦P2)R)} = 
{t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ R[A] − Nmax((P1♦P2)R)} = 
{t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ R[A] − (Nmax(P1R)  ∩  Nmax(P2R)  ∩  XX(P1, P2)R)} = 
{t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ (R[A] − Nmax(P1R))  ∪  (R[A] − Nmax(P2R)) ∪ (R[A] − XX(P1, P2)R)} = 
{t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ max(P1R)  ∪  max(P2R)  ∪  (R[A] − XX(P1, P2)R)} = 
σ[P1](R)  ∪  σ[P2](R)  ∪ {t ∈ R: t[A] ∈ R[A] − XX(P1, P2)R} 
 
We have:  t[A] ∈ R[A] − XX(P1, P2)R   iff   
   t[A] ∉ XX(P1, P2)R   iff 
   t[A] ∈ {w ∈ R[A]: ¬(∃ v ∈ Nmax(P1R), ∃ v’ ∈ Nmax(P2R):  v ∈ P1↑w  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑w  ∧  v = v’)   iff 
   ¬(∃ v ∈ Nmax(P1R), ∃ v’ ∈ Nmax(P2R):  v ∈ P1↑t[A]  ∧  v’ ∈ P2↑t[A]  ∧  v = v’)   iff 
   ¬( t[A] ∈ Nmax(P1R) ∩ Nmax(P2R):   P1↑t[A]  ∩  P2↑t[A]  ≠ ∅)   iff 
    (t[A] ∈ Nmax(P1R) ∩ Nmax(P2R):   P1↑t[A]  ∩  P2↑t[A]  = ∅) 
  
Setting      YY(P1, P2)R := {t ∈ R : t[A] ∈ Nmax(P1R) ∩ Nmax(P2R)  ∧  P1↑t[A]  ∩  P2↑t[A]  =  ∅} 
we finally get:  σ[P1♦P2](R)  =  σ[P1](R)  ∪  σ[P2](R)  ∪  YY(P1, P2)R   Q.e.d. 
 
 
